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The Persistence of Utopia  
Plasticity and Difference from Roland Barthes to 
Catherine Malabou 
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor 
Pennsylvania State University 
“Utopias are designed to keep people out.”—Toni Morrison1 
 
The theorizing of utopia is a persistent theme throughout several 
generations of the French continental tradition and, alongside the process 
theory of Alfred North Whitehead, to a large degree recuperates the concept 
of utopia from its supposed dismissal by Marx and his intellectual 
descendants. Most recently, attention to the notion of plasticity, popularized 
(relatively speaking) by Catherine Malabou, extends speculation on utopian 
possibility.  Compelled to answer to Marx’s denigration of utopia as fantasy, 
the tendency was (still is, for many) to compensate for the absence of a 
programmatic politics by stressing what is “useful” about utopian 
dreaming, and therefore where or how exactly a utopian text reveals or 
creates political drive, or motivates political action.  This is what gets called 
utopian anticipation, and we can look back at the history of utopian writing, 
and note the precision of a writer’s perception of tendencies in the present 
that are extrapolated as future possibilities.  The “use” of utopia is 
fundamentally diagnostic from this point of view, as much as it is 
speculative.   
Indeed, it is the speculative part, the non-concrete-ness of utopia, 
which provokes the skepticism of political and social philosophy. On the 
other hand, French theorists throughout the twentieth century generally 
approach utopian speculation not simply as a form of political modelling, 
but rather as a representation of imagining difference.  A political concept of 
utopia traditionally seeks achievement of something that can be called 
“concrete”; indeed, the term concrete utopia commonly appears in Utopian 
Studies.  From a purely literary standpoint, however, any given utopian 
narrative is as concrete as it can be or in fact needs to be. Contemporary 
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utopia theorists now tend to argue that “concretization” of any one utopian 
model is an outcome to be avoided. The so-called blueprint model is rejected 
as exclusionary and often reactionary—as Toni Morrison’s epigraph 
suggests.  What takes the place of the “blueprint” is a model of utopia far 
more plastic than concrete: indeed, I will argue that utopia is plastic, in the 
very sense that Malabou offers us today. 
 In this essay, I offer a theoretical grounding for thinking about utopia 
in terms of plasticity. Coming from two directions, I consider briefly the 
associations of the concept of utopia and the material plastic throughout the 
twentieth century. This account begins in 1953, when French philosopher 
Roland Barthes charges his compatriots to explicate cultural myths that 
harden into unchallenged habits of thought; this intellectual work is the only 
way of fighting (façon de militer) offered to them. Four years later arrives 
Mythologies, a full-throated attack on the “repetitive, fixed discourse”2 of 
politics, and an incisive critique of the “plasticization” of nature, of minds, of 
ideas and creativity.  In an easily overlooked, three-page essay included in 
Mythologies collection, “Plastic” seems to celebrate a “miraculous” modern 
material fated to transform contemporary society in the Acceleration Age of 
Western capitalism.  A closer reading reveals a dark warning against 
ideological conformity and a vision of a plasticized future incapable of 
creative evolution. Barthes would eventually (by 1975) speak of utopia 
explicitly in his work, as I shall discuss; and I will argue that his ultimately 
positive view of utopia, as opposed to myth, hinges precisely upon the 
notion of plasticity he represents so literally in the 1957 essay. 
 Fifty years on, philosopher Catherine Malabou publishes the ground-
breaking What Should We Do With Our Brain?, a breakthrough in her own 
work on Hegelian plasticity and the beginning of a new materialist 
description of the structuring of life itself as an expression of plasticity. In so 
doing, Malabou offers a more optimistic—indeed vital(ist)—view for a 
utopian future: not the consumer utopia brought about through the 
“modern miracle” of plastic, but through the persistence of imaginal and 
vital forms of speculation made possible by neuroplasticity. Reading Barthes 
on plastic alongside Malabou on plasticity, what seems at stake for both 
writers is nothing short of life-affirmation, to borrow Nietzsche’s term, 
through a necessary contestation of ideology. In “Plastic” Barthes can only 
visualize a world gradually plasticized into a kind of death-in-life, politically 
and aesthetically. Malabou’s explorations into neuroscience and 
neuroplasticity propose a natural (sic) capacity for repair and resilience 
which the plasticity of all living cells makes possible; entropy gives way to 
renewed energy. Reproduction of sameness is disrupted by the production 
of difference. 
 I argue that theorists have overlooked the use of utopia as not only the 
reproduction of difference, or what Malabou calls positive plasticity, but 
also as, therefore, a disruption; Malabou might prefer the term accident here. 
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Tracing the concept of plasticity from Barthes to Malabou, with a nod at 
Miguel Abensour, this essay teases out the links between a contemporary 
notion of plasticity to argue, simply put, that utopia is plastic. This plasticity 
of the concept ensures its political force. These links, obscured in “Plastic,” 
Barthes makes only later in his writing. But for Malabou, plasticity underlies 
a principle of futurity and/as generativity, such that new forms, new 
meanings, new concepts emerge through difference. Utopia’s horizons of 
potentiality depend on difference, and on non-achievement. Finally, I argue 
that the “persistence of utopia” (Abensour) as a form of thinking is the most 
important, and political, effect of utopian plasticity. 
A New Generation: The Utopian Myth of Plastic 
  In the mid-1950s, cultural philosopher Roland Barthes is inspired to 
write the essay “Plastic” after attending an exhibition in Paris celebrating the 
virtue of this “miracle” material.  The exhibit was a sort of World’s Fair 
event, one of many launched from the 1930s to the 1950s in Europe and the 
United States. As Folke Kihlstedt notes, “these kinds of events in the post-
Depression United States “delivered to the large cross-section of American 
society … a buoyant, optimistic message extolling the positive consequences 
of science and technology for life in the future.”3 As several recent histories 
of plastic spell out, since the 1930s plastic has projected, as it were, a 
visionary landscape of economic and material plenty, as well as a future of 
open possibility for the modern consumer.4 In fact, the consumer is the 
target at the Paris exhibition, indeed at all such product fairs, as the cheap 
manufactured products plastic made available a consumer utopia such as 
the world had not seen. Historians agree, whether they are “pro” or “con” 
the dawning of the “Plasticene Age,” that plastic made possible in a real 
sense the democratizing of modern consumerism.  
Jeffrey Meikle, a historian of the plastics industry, adds that as long as 
plastics were seen as the cutting-edge industry for the future, plastics were 
extravagantly praised as the material “from which [Americans] would shape 
the precise contours of a desired future” that is “cleaner and brighter.”  The 
connection of plastic to a utopian future began even befpre World War II, 
when the new applications for plastic, as well as ongoing improvements in 
material science, suggested consumer-product possibilities that could fuel a 
new, post-war consumer market. Women’s nylon stockings are introduced 
in 1939, and further celebrated at the 1940 World’s Fair with the appearance, 
Venus-like, of “Miss Chemistry of the Future” from an oversized test tube.5  
This was just the beginning of the plastic industry’s incursion into fashion. 
According to Meikle, “journalists and advertisers built up so many utopian 
predictions about plastics in the postwar world” that by the 1950s “the older 
utopian vision of the white-coated laboratory chemist” combined with “the 
newer vision of a postwar plastic cornucopia” to configure the image of 
“molecule engineers” able to master the design of any kind of “new 
molecule” needed “for a given purpose.” These engineers would 
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“streamline” the United States and its Western allies smoothly into a 
modern age of unprecedented abundance.6 While the ubiquity of plastic 
products—to which Roland Barthes would respond—began to make them 
seem commonplace and “cheap,” leading manufacturers redoubled 
marketing efforts to reclaim its reputation as the “modern miracle” by 
inventing a modern concept of “convenience.”  The return of women from 
war-time factory jobs to the home suggested strategic capture of the 
“women’s market” with the seemingly irresistible triple-convenience 
promise of labor-saving, time-saving, and cost-savings.  In a bizarre 
expression of plastic’s labor-saving possibilities, DuPont promises that the 
“best things in life” come in Cellophane, and shows a baby being delivered 
by a stork in a sack of transparent plastic film (the very kind with labels 
warning of children and pets choking or suffocating).  
In this general historical context of manufacturing ingenuity and 
stoked-up consumerism appears Barthes’s essay. He investigates what he 
presciently recognizes as the visible form of the modern death drive: plastic. 
This claim might seem incommensurate with the brevity of the essay—just 
barely four pages—and with the celebratory, even triumphalist tone of the 
piece. To consider the relation of the essay to the title of the collection in 
which it appears, however, is to regard the colors of this rhetoric with a 
skeptical eye. Barthes’ essay is simultaneously a celebration and a 
condemnation of this artificial material, invented a century earlier but 
suitable for widespread use as a consumer product material only after 
World War II. By the mid-1950s, the chemical and manufacturing industries, 
foreseeing unprecedented profits, promoted plastic as the modern material, 
and enlisted the genius of the bourgeoning advertising industry to tell the 
story of this remarkably versatile, durable, substance that promises to drive 
“history in the making.”  
This story, as much as the substance itself, is Barthes’ subject: the 
myth, in short, of plastic. It is at once an origin myth, and a modern cultural 
myth. But like many robust myths, the symbolic story hides a barer reality. 
Obscured by the symbolic economy of a “plasticized world” of consumers, 
buoyed by modern notions of innovation and “convenience,” Barthes sees a 
toxic underside: a world of “users” with an instrumentalist attitude toward 
other human beings, toward nature, toward life itself. “Plastic” narrates the 
myth of plastic as science fiction, presenting a possible world, not far off, as 
a kind of zombie-world. It is not just the aesthetics of plastic that Barthes 
rejects. While Barthes clearly does dislike things made of plastic—cheap, 
lifeless, fake copies of things once made with natural materials—at stake is 
something more abstract: the “conceptual matter” of plastic; that is, the 
plasticity of the individual and the social mind, in the post-war, modern age.  
Barthes makes it clear that plastic and plasticity are material figurings 
comprising a narrative regarding freedom and unfreedom in modern mass 
culture. 
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 Barthes clearly understands all this, and recognizes the genius behind 
plastic’s mythical story.  He recalls plastic’s genealogical roots in imitation 
materials “historically bourgeois in origin,” and locates plastic’s value—or 
rather, its virtue (to which I will return), in its ability to fulfill the bourgeois 
desire for the appearances of wealth. Even this “pretention,” however, is 
betrayed by a “fashion for plastic” that betrays the bare reality of its 
“decline” into a “household material.”7 Barthes makes the connection when 
he says that like the common man, plastic is a material that “consents to be 
prosaic.”8 With its artificial “fecund[ity]”,9 its easy availability, its infinite 
malleability, its “quick-change talent” for appearing in any desired color, 
texture, design, or shape, plastic stands as quite literally an unprecedented 
human achievement: the invention of a material developed for the sole 
purpose of its usability. A uniquely human material invention, its unique 
virtues of malleability and durability are betrayed by the utilitarian 
imperative placed upon it. Its very formlessness allows for infinite 
replication, for imitation of any other form. This essential use-value of 
plastic is born out of its paradoxical union of pliability and durability. In 
other words, plastic’s very plasticity is its genius. 
 With a nod to the concept of plasticity as an aesthetic term, Barthes 
begins his essay by arguing that plastic is an “artificial Matter” that is also an 
idea.  This idea has to do with the visibility of space.  Opening the essay with 
the assertion that plastic is notionally “ubiquity made visible,”10 he ends the 
essay with a seeming triumphant visionof a material take-over by, and even 
incorporation of, plastic:  
[Nature] is no longer the Idea, the pure Substance to be 
regained or imitated: an artificial Matter, more bountiful 
than all the natural deposits, is about to replace her, and to 
determine the very invention of forms.  … The hierarchy 
of substances is abolished; a single one replaces them all: 
the whole world can be plasticized, and even life itself 
since, we are told, they are beginning to make plastic 
aortas.11   
There is more to this passage than the pros and cons of natural materials 
versus plastic.  It is impossible not to hear echoes of once-conventional 
descriptions of art and aesthetics, “holding a mirror to Nature” as an artist’s 
primary task. Barthes reiterates popular celebrations of this manmade 
substance out of which the natural world will be not simply imitated, but 
rivaled and replaced.  Barthes suggests even more: plastic promises not 
simply to “mimic” nature, nor to “be” nature, but to be super-natural.  
This is not the “plastic virtue” Malabou will refer to, in the sense of the 
plasticity “possessed by animals, plants, and living things in general.”12  The 
“virtue” of plastic in Barthes’ argument is its alleged capability of 
superseding those natural beings. In one respect, plastic represents a 
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triumph of human ingenuity and inventiveness: it is a substance not found 
in nature anywhere: “More than a substance,” Barthes writes, “plastic is the 
very idea of its infinite transformation. … Plastic remains completely 
impregnated by this astonishment: it is less an object than the trace of a 
movement. And since this movement is here virtually infinite … plastic is, 
ultimately, a spectacle to be deciphered: the spectacle of its end products.”13  
This is a moment of technological sublime, it seems; the “perpetual 
astonishment” before plastic is at the sight of the “proliferating forms of 
matter” that replicate endlessly. As the “trace” of the “very idea of its 
transformation,” plastic stands as a unique material aporia, if such a thing 
can exist.  Barthes’ story is about production and reproduction, and the 
mythical and mystified belief that man can be more than simply “like a god” 
but himself God. The folly of such a fantasy motivates the plots of both 
ancient myth and, in our modern times, science fiction, starting with Mary 
Shelley’s uncanny classic. That novel’s ongoing hold on us has precisely to 
do with the Frankenstein’s failure to adapt to a world that includes the 
monster he created.  Western myth and science fiction alike share a brash 
positioning of man’s fantasy at the brink of material reality, the line of a 
utopian horizon where the material and the immaterial merge: the dark edge 
of accelerationism.  
The “thing-ness” of plastic products is, as we have seen, what 
concerns Barthes.  From these products emerges a by-product of sorts: the 
myth itself, the narrative born (like Frankenstein’s creature) of experiments 
in plasticity. The “story” of plastic and its endless proliferation of products is 
not just about the universal production and reproduction of consumer 
products for a world market.  The story of plastic betrays itself as a 
peculiarly gendered account of (pro)creation without the need of Woman, 
given the right technology:  
At the entrance to the stall, the public waits in a long line 
to see accomplished the magical operation par excellence: 
the conversion of substance. An ideally shaped machine, 
tabulated and oblong (the right shape to manifest the 
secret of an itinerary), effortless draws from a heap of 
greenish crystals a series of gleaming fluted pin trays. At 
one end the raw telluric substance, and at the other the 
perfect human object; and between these two extremes, 
nothing but a trajectory, scarcely watched over by a 
helmeted employee, half god, half robot.14  
This passage describes a technological birth scene, no less “miraculous” in 
its presentation than the Creature’s birth in Frankenstein’s lab. But Barthes’ 
plastic birth parody involves scarcely any visible labor, the mother reduced 
to matrixial machine. Barthes’ narrative of this reproductive process takes 
place without the exhausting intellectual and physical effort Shelley’s 
legendary scientist puts in: the “indecent” violation of “nature’s secrets”; the 
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intentional supersizing, partly for “ease of assembly,” partly for the sheer 
satisfaction of “bigger is better” for the “new race” of Man upon whom the 
scientist, as their creator, fantasizes.  
 The extrusion machine at the center of the scene that Barthes sketches 
out displaces, indeed makes entirely invisible, the “labor” of reproduction.  
In an almost primal scene, the machine is described in terms of a maternal 
body in labor: “[it is an] ideally shaped machine, tabulated and oblong (the 
right shape to manifest the secret of an itinerary).”15  This strange wording 
again aligns this technological birth narrative with Mary Shelley’s earlier 
version. What is secret is the process by which an idea(l) is materialized; 
what is manifest are the products formed from that secret idea(l) and 
through that secret process. In Frankenstein the proprietary secret, as it were, 
is kept hidden for our own moral good. In “Plastic,” we are not told why. 
Trade secrets.  But the secrecy is for own good as well, for our own economic 
good, and for “goods” whose circulation is something like the lifeblood of a 
consumer economy. 
The real labor, the “secret of the itinerary,” is in revealing the plasticity 
of the myth; which is to say, the power of ideology.  These are the 
proprietary secrets neither Dr. Frankenstein nor contemporary plastics 
manufacturers would reveal.  The “ideal” shape of the machine itself 
represents or “manifests” the hidden secret.  What makes the machine shape 
“ideal” is that it disguises, in the tropes of technology the labor of the 
mother’s body. This machine’s productive labor is easeful, quiet, and with a 
little oil labor can continue indefinitely.  The value of maternal labor thus 
evacuated, the admiration of the observer no longer includes that agony, 
and the presentation of a unique “human object.” We are to admire the 
smooth “effortless” operation of the labor involved in mechanical 
reproduction; and we are to admire the “very spectacle of the end products” 
(emphasis added).   
The language of insemination and pregnancy, the echoes of maternity 
and labor (including midwifery) point toward the apparent generativity of 
the capitalist imagination.16  The scene performs the myth of plastic, with its 
gendering of technological reproduction and materiality. The maternal 
machine is feminine, yet built by man; the plastic is manmade, though it 
“bends just like a woman” (to borrow Bob Dylan’s unfortunate lyric) and is 
the perfect material for the “proliferating forms” of capitalist desire. The 
spectacle lies not simply in the crowning of individual products themselves 
as they leave the machine – but the display of the variety and proliferation of 
plastic.  Think of the display cases and shelving that make up the very 
architecture of the modern supermarket: the showcasing of plastic at this 
“exhibition” of plenty and consumer “choice” instantiates the ever-plastic 
ideological formations of desire and purchasing power. 
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Barthes does not mention that “raw” plastic, not yet molded, is called 
virgin plastic.  The trope of sexual reproduction belies the superseding of 
embodied feminine creativity by the superior potency of masculine 
invention. The secret, the miracle, the manifestation, the ubiquity made visible: 
these are godly attributes belonging to “the mind” that “impregnates”; 
hence the “perpetual astonishment, the reverie of man [sic] at the sight of the 
proliferations of substance, detecting the connections (liaisons) between the 
singular of its origin and the plural of its effects”17 (emphasis added).  The 
“singular of its origin” is not the machine, or the man, but an idea of self-
generativity: the “plural of its effects” is the endlessly plastic display of 
objects symbolizing “the measure of man.” Plastic does more than just replace 
nature, in other words.  It stands for something, as a symbol, and stands in 
for something.  
What plastic stands (in) for becomes clearer in another essay in 
Mythologies, entitled “Toys.” In exploring the relationship of natural and 
artificial materials in children’s toys, Barthes points more directly to the 
entangled relationship of material shaping with ideological shaping, 
production and reproduction. Barthes excavates the cultural myth 
underlying the production of children’s toys in contemporary France with a 
critique not simply of “toy aesthetics” but also, relatedly in his view, of the 
deadening effects of that material takeover on children themselves: 
The fact that French toys literally prefigure the universe of 
adult functions can only prepare the child to accept them 
all, constituting for him even before he can think about it 
the alibi of a Nature which has created for all time 
soldiers, postmen, and Vespas. … [T]he child cannot 
constitute himself as anything but an owner, a user, never 
as a creator; he does not invent the world, he utilizes it[.]18 
The plastic material from which these toys are molded informs what Barthes 
regards as the “posthumous life” of toy and child alike: the “elaborate” 
compounds “look both crude and hygienic, they eliminate the pleasure, the 
gentleness, the humanity of touch.”19  Touch is the heart of aesthetics, its 
root-word referring not to the physical sense so much as the sensorium 
through we which are continuously touched, by each one of our senses, by 
objects around us, by other people. Barthes suggests, though he doesn’t put 
it this way, that plastic is anaesthetic.  
Because the essay “Plastic” follows “Toys” in the Mythologies volume, 
Barthes can develop the thought introduced in the passage above, to argue 
that plastic’s negative predominance over nature eventually “will command 
the very invention of shapes.”20  Plastic’s designs are not just of us but on us: 
its very flexibility and acquiescence to form teaches passivity not action; 
acceptance, not resistance; compliance, not creativity.  A plasticized world 
deterritorializes the “natural world” so-called, and is reterritorialized in the 
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image of producer desire. Thus it represents the contemporary corruption of 
a familiar aesthetic ambition: the achievement through human inventiveness 
and technology of “a second nature” that perfects the first, and takes 
priority: “The hierarchy of substances is abolished; a single one replaces 
them all: the whole world can be plasticized, and even life itself since, we are 
told, they are beginning to make plastic aortas.”21  
There it is: a generation of replicants whose fragile tissue and bones 
are replaced by durable and enduring plastic ones, molded to order in a 
single form: the consumer—and more specifically, a consumer whose desire 
to consume or “use” is molded by a bourgeois-capitalist political economy. 
Barthes ends his essay at the verge of a dystopian future, with the image of a 
plasticized heart.  He wonders what a future of plasticized children in a 
plasticized world might be or become, or whether they are to become at all.  
The metaphorical nature of Barthes’ investigation of a consumer 
utopia/dystopia and plasticity is made more concrete later, when his 
attitude toward utopia shifts from one of suspicion (as fantasy that displaces 
political action) to one of authorization:  
What is a Utopia for? To make meaning.  Confronting the 
present, my present, a Utopia is a second term which 
permits the sign to function: discourse about reality 
becomes possible, I emerge from the aphasia into which I 
am plunged by the panic of all that doesn't work within 
me, in this world which is mine. The Utopia is familiar to 
the writer, for the writer is a bestower of meaning.22  
The “new semantics” characterizing his notion of text-as-utopia depends 
upon the disruption of meaning and “repetitive, fixed discourse” are 
possible only through an affirmative “break” with a reality that is 
(mis)shaped by cultural myths and formations. 
Plasticity, Progress, Reproduction 
 While plasticity is not a concept that utopia theorist Miguel Abensour, 
contemporaneous to both Barthes (for a time) and Malabou, entertains his 
work represents an intermediate position between Barthes and Malabou. 
Utopia is a form of disruption, he suggests: “the non-coincidence between 
what was projected and what has come about throws us back into a new 
struggle for alterity.”23 This foreshadows Malabou’s stress on “the ontology 
of the accident,” in her book of that title,24 and her call for a “new 
relationship with the image of our brain”—that is, with our potentially 
plastic identities.  Abensour describes utopia not in terms of perfection or 
permanence, but persistence: “The persistence of utopia, we see, is due not 
so much to the repeated pursuit of a determinate content as to the ever-
reborn movement toward something indeterminate.”25 Finally, Absensour’s 
interest in the “engine of enigmatic rebirth” echoes tropes of impregnation, 
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birth, death and life that underlie Barthes’s essay on plastic, and Malabou’s 
later theorization of “the entre-deux,” a conceptual time-space of neo-
Hegelian intercourse between-two that makes something-else possible.  The 
entre-deux corresponds to Abensour’s notion of the repetitive encounter with 
alterity, which is the “essence of utopia … [that] derives its force from non-
accomplishment.”26  
Catherine Malabou’s work on plasticity clarifies the connection of 
utopia, futurity, and plasticity. She produces a series of studies concerning 
plasticity, grounded in her earliest work on Hegel. The Hypatia essay, “The 
Future of Hegel” (2000), is a précis for the English-speaking world of her 
1996 monograph, L’Avenir de Hegel: Plasticité, Temporalité, Dialectique, which 
appeared in translation as The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and 
Dialectic in 2005.  What followed was the groundbreaking What Should We 
Do With Our Brain? (2004; English translation 2008), and the “sequel,” 
Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity (2009; English 
translation 2012). Malabou rarely speaks of plastic products per se with the 
exception of plastique;27 although in a 2013 essay, “The Living Room: 
Plasticity and Hospitality,”28 she does point toward the “range of meanings” 
the words plasticity and plastic can embrace—including “all the various 
forms of ‘plastic’ in our world [from the “plastic arts” to plastic wood, 
plastic money; plastic explosives].” In that essay as well she notes, as she 
had not in previous writing about plasticity, that she is anticipated at least to 
some degree by Roland Barthes’s 1957 Mythologies text: “Roland Barthes 
alone has devoted to [plastic] a short chapter of Mythologies. … Barthes 
warns … that plastic’s ability to become anything at all may reduce anything 
to nothing by dissolving all differences. … Because plastic never presents 
itself without form, plastic is always thought as a factor of identification, 
standardisation, globalisation, and never as a possible welcome of the 
other.”  
 This opening recognizes, however briefly, that both philosophers see 
in the unique materiality of plastic a radical paradox, whether one considers 
brain plasticity or material plasticity. With her grounding in Hegel and the 
dialectic, Malabou articulates a concept of plasticity that incorporates but 
extends beyond Barthes’ investigation of the myth of plastic. But Barthes no 
less than Malabou apprehends a link between the idea of plasticity, 
creativity, hospitality, and a politics of freedom.  The uncanniness of plastic 
Barthes describes and the “forms of contradiction” essential to Malabou’s 
notion of plasticity are different approaches to the same crux: how to 
balance the twin powers of plasticity—resistance and yielding—against an 
entropy dictated by ideology, which by its nature wants to replicate itself 
endlessly.   
 It is not surprising, perhaps, that as tropes of gender difference emerge 
in their accounts. Barthes and Malabou tilt at a common enemy: late-
capitalist universalism.  Barthes’ essay imagines the threat of negative 
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plasticity’s replication (reproduction of the same) rather than production, 
understood as producing the same-with-a-difference. Barthes perceives that 
the myth of plastic attempts to neutralize the toxicities of ideological 
conformity. Modernity’s drive for “more and better” disguises a creative 
sclerosis, uncannily manifested in the proliferations, replications, and 
implications of a world that “can be plasticized”29 and to a frightening 
extent, already has been.  Malabou picks up where Barthes leaves off.  
Because the concept of plasticity also embraces the work of making meaning 
(in the process of taking form) and of resisting meaning (in the potentiality 
for deforming, reforming), the later philosopher theorizes being itself—
Life—in terms of contemporary “plastic” virtues: that is, in terms creativity 
and resilience.  Even as those terms are co-opted by our contemporary 
neoliberal political economy,30 as Barthes presciently foresees in “Plastic”, 
Malabou can claim without irony, as Barthes does not, that plasticity is Life 
and extends the possibilities of utopia beyond the text.   
Like Barthes, Malabou’s thoughts turn to children.  At stake for both 
are competing conceptions of the world as either deterministic and limited 
in possibility; or as “plastic,” open to “possibilities for a becoming on the 
basis of the effacement of every future, for a transformation of the trace or 
mark, and for a historical transdifferentiation.”31  Her example is the cohort 
of Romanian orphans left after the collapse of the Ceausescu regime in 1989. 
Her reading concerns an experiment around neuroplasticity—yet the 
political dimension is not obscure. So psychologically and physically 
deprived were these children, that physicians, psychologists and other 
scientists recognize a unique “case study” regarding the interaction of 
environment and the brain.  The orphans’ being-in-the-world under 
Ceausescu was, they learned, literally written on the body, their brain 
development actually in-formed by their abuse, expressed in physiological 
deformations that disrupted, in some cases arrested, mental and physical 
development.  
What also scientists discovered, however, was that the children, 
removed from conditions of bare existence, regain neuronal plasticity. They 
are able to repair themselves and recover a mental pliability visible not only 
in behavior, but in the neuronal architecture of their brains. They could play, 
once again, with possibility: they were resilient, a quality Malabou contrasts 
with being flexible, or passive: “in order to return to themselves after the 
destructive trials they had suffered, these children had to create their own 
constancy [against] a reductionist discourse that models and naturalizes the 
neuronal process [… legitimating] a certain social and political 
functioning.”32 Malabou characterizes these “reconfigurations and this 
becoming” as constituted by “ruptures and resistance”: “If these [children] 
were simply ‘flexible’… they would be not resilient but conciliatory, that is 
to say, passive. But these individuals are, on the contrary, capable of 
changing difference.”33  
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This suggests that the virtue of plasticity lies in the plurality of the 
origin, to reverse Barthes’ formulation, not in its singularity; it is resistance to 
forces, not acquiescence to them, that strengthens every living thing.  
Resistance, Malabou implies, motivates adaptation, resilience, evolution 
itself. Therefore what we should do with our brains, Malabou argues, is 
what the brain wants: the capacity to resist, or de-form, hardened synaptic 
formations.  Understanding the nature of brain plasticity as an active tension, 
an entre-deux34 or dialogue, Malabou pursues the vitality of human identity 
as an intra-agential process that regards the traditional body/mind relation 
in terms of entanglement, hardly a clear division, of matter and spirit.  In 
fact, the singularity of the “stem cell” (a primary figure of plasticity for 
Malabou) lies in its capacity to “bring together the origin, as their name 
indicates, and the future, the capacity for self re-form.” This capacity for self-
reform stands therefore as “the best possible definition of plasticity … this 
transformation or this transition—which cannot simply be the result of 
observation or of objective description.”35  
Where Barthes says that life can be plasticized, pointing ironically 
toward the death-in-life of such a development, Malabou argues that 
plasticity is life, whether one speaks of the life of the mind, the life of a body, 
or indeed the “life” of a text. Such a proposal directs her, as she well knows, 
toward the kind of new-materialist inquiry that has taken hold today.36 
Recent commentators propose that even with his post-structuralist bearings, 
Barthes’ attention to modes of affect may well anticipate the reintroduction 
of the body into contemporary criticism. Either way, both Barthes and 
Malabou clarify the urgency of understanding the concept of plasticity in all 
its paradoxes and complexities, and through its various registers (material; 
mental/psychological; political; aesthetical; ethical).  Without doubt, the 
late-capitalist ideological and economic structures that currently dominate 
social, political, and economic movement resist strenuously any program for 
changing difference much less the possibility of radical reform(ing) of the 
world. As we know, the genius of capitalism is its capacity to neutralize any 
radical impulse, to incorporate it, to claim it for its own purposes.  The recent 
popularity of nootropics and proprietary brain exercise regimes is fueled by 
the promise of a “brain upgrade” improving cognition, memory, creativity, 
and more. One frequently advertised product today gains its therapeutic 
power from a chemical derived from jellyfish.  Putting aside the truth or not 
of therapeutic claims, it is interesting that the product’s advertising stresses 
the sourcing from jellyfish: is there a more “plastic” animal form than the 
primitive jellyfish?  Malabou comments on the specific interest in such 
animals:  
In the course of evolution, regeneration—that possibility 
of naturally repairing all or part of the body—has largely 
been lost among mammals. This is why the discovery of 
stem cells—able to repair, reform, and regenerate organs 
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and damaged tissue—forces us to look two ways at once, 
both to the future and to the past: to the future, that is, 
towards the perfecting of technology destined for the 
medical use of these cells and to the past, to regeneration 
as very ancient property connected to primitive animals, 
such as hydra, planarians, and starfish.37 
Barthes’ Mythologies closes with essay entitled “Myth Today,” which 
explains his impatience with “confusions” of Nature and History “in the 
description of our reality … I wanted to expose in the decorative display of 
what-goes-without-saying the ideological abuse I believed was hidden 
there.” Those “confusions,” that abuse, are the workings of myth under late 
capitalism; and in a retrospective preface to a 1970 edition of Mythologies 
Barthes describes his work of thirteen years earlier an effort to “account in 
detail for [rather than “piously denounce”] the mystification which 
transforms petit bourgeois culture into a universal culture.”38 As previously 
argued, Barthes’ arch celebration of plastic production, from the “singular of 
the origin” to the “plural of the effects,” unfolds a science-fiction narrative 
that foresees a cultural death-in-life, embodied as it were in the replication of 
“the same” through the proliferation of plastic consumer items—and human 
zombies.  His call, in 1970, was for “cultural remediation” that would make 
possible a world that sees the virtue in generative reproduction as difference: 
“In actual fact, the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is confused, 
made of yielding, shapeless associations. One must fully stress this open 
character of the concept.”39 Modern myths are alibis, notes Barthes, stories 
concealing their ideological content.40 To speak of plastic in terms of 
mythology—“the knowledge contained in a mythical concept”—is to look 
for unspoken aspects of that content. Ironically, however, the genius of 
capitalism is its ability to absorb challenges to its universalizing force: 
corporate greenwashing is an obvious example of a further obscuring in 
response to the clarity of a different story, based in alternative values than 
expansionism and profit. 
Malabou’s work on plasticity clarifies Barthes’ suspicion of the 
aestheticization of plastic by the market as a political matter. This is the cause 
of the frisson plastic provokes in him, particularly in light of his closing line: 
that “all of Nature can be plasticized, and even Life itself.” This (political) 
failure is the horror motivating Barthes’ exposure of the bad faith in 
promoting plastic as a life-giving material, and in lending to this material a 
potentiality it does not own except though the market’s attribution of “next 
generation” innovation. And as actual plastic forms are incapable of 
changing on their own, without a principle of (self-)generation of difference, 
plastic remains anamorphic stuff with the capacity to be molded, but not to 
repair itself.  It has no material resiliency.  With the integration of science 
that Barthes did not have, Malabou elucidates Barthes’ ironical presentation 
of the “alchemical” (thus magical, mystical, mythical) essence of plastic/ity 
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as the idea of transformation. Barthes’ language of magic and myth 
metaphorizes what Malabou would make as literal as possible: the paradox 
of plasticity as at once informing and deforming, as well as reforming and 
transforming.41 Even more literally: Malabou’s materialism describes 
plasticity “made flesh,” the resiliency and reparability of the body, of the 
brain, of identity. 
Malabou’s proposition of “the new ontological transformability”42 
extends her description of a plasticity of/in difference fundamental to 
becoming rather than simply being (as a fixed shape or entity).  This capacity 
returns us to plasticity, and to utopia. An intermediate, mobile positioning 
between positive and negative plasticity is necessary to remediate as well as 
transform. I propose that the concept of utopia comprises a Malabou’s 
notion of a “positive plasticity,” which preserves the resiliency allows for “a 
kind of contradictory constitution, a synthesis of memory and forgetting, of 
constitution and effacement of forms.”43  By re-presenting this capacity for 
reform, one avoids “producing a mirror image of the world,” and produces 
“the form of another possible world.”44 This is the “agency of disobedience 
to every constituted form, a refusal to submit to a model.”45  
The resistant kernel of plasticity is the resistant agency of utopia, I 
propose. The previously favored model of utopia as blueprint, the so-called 
“static-state” model, exemplifies what Malabou calls negative plasticity: a 
yielding to, and subsequent hardening of, form.  Such hardening is a refusal 
of difference, as (again) the epigraph from Toni Morrison signals. What our 
brain wants, what “we” want, and why utopia persists, is the capacity to 
change difference.46 If brain plasticity makes possible something like repair of 
the brain’s regenerative capacity, and of the resilience of subjectivity, can we 
say the same of plasticized ideological formation beyond the mind? 
Malabou addresses cultural remediation quite specifically, throwing down 
“the plastic challenge” that subjectivity issues “between the upsurge and the 
explosion of form”: “to do what they undoubtedly have never done: construct and 
entertain a relation with their brain as the image of a world to come.”47 Malabou’s 
argues that we are still foreign to the very historicity of the human brain. 
“Intimacy” with the work of our brains, she proposes, with the 
“consciousness of the brain,” is something we used to be at home with—the 
ancient myths might be a perfect example here—but we no longer are. “In 
this sense, we are still foreign to ourselves, at the threshold of this ‘new 
world,’ which we fail to realize makes up our very intimacy itself.”48      
Utopia is that “image of a world to come,” born from a “utopian 
moment” of an encounter with alterity. In utopian narratives, the utopian 
traveler who stands “at the threshold of this ‘new world’” quite precisely 
“finds himself” to be at once familiar and strange, the ontological basis of 
“who I am” being disrupted.  One writer refers to this moment of confusion 
or wonder as the source of transformative energy: to turn away from that 
energy, that potentiality, is to be “dispossessed.” As Malabou suggests, these 
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encounters bring to us our most intimate experiences of “who we are.” 
These are also moments when the stories we tell to ourselves and about 
ourselves—our myths—are illuminated: the attentive one, the resilient one, 
will look hard enough to understand the “open” (sometimes contradictory) 
shaping of myth itself, myth’s plastic nature.  
Perhaps a new way to think about utopia is by asking ourselves, as 
individuals and a network, or community, or nation: To what extent are we 
plastic?  Barthes and Malabou, with Abensour between them, attune us to a 
notion of plasticity and/as difference, through their insistent and persistent 
attention to breaking of form even as form emerges. This essential plasticity, 
a co-constitution of agency and passivity, keeps vital an opening toward 
difference, and creates the capacity for the ongoingness of emergent 
formations.  In this way only can we regard utopia as “sustainable” or 
“persistent”: in its play of potentialities and possibilities, rather than 
replicant patterning.  Utopia is the space that stays open to the possibility of 
new, emergent forms.  It is positively plastic, aligning with Malabou’s 
description (in What Should We Do with Our Brain?) of plasticity’s 
contradictory nature, at which “possibility, the wholly other version,” is 
held open by “the expectation of the arrival of another way of being,” or, “a 
possibility of waiting.”49  
Conclusion: Utopian Biopolitics  
 Malabou’s most recent work extends these investigations of plasticity 
to an even more radical position: that the vital plasticity of life makes it 
necessary to think beyond the biopolitical, defined as “the means by which life 
is introduced ‘into political techniques.”50 This recent claim I see as the most 
incisive response to “the plastic challenge” she floats in What Should We Do 
with Our Brain?, and indeed in “One Life Only: Biological Resistance, 
Political Resistance,”51 Malabou takes to task “the political becoming of 
biological concepts” in contemporary thought, because “[p]aradoxically, 
they [Foucault and Agamben] expel the biological that is supposed to 
constitute their core--and it thereby becomes their unthinkable residue.”52 
Arguing for “a new materialism asserting the coincidence of the symbolic 
and the biological” Malabou can pick up where Barthes left off in 
Mythologies. She might say, that Barthes recognition’ of plastic in biopolitical 
terms is limited by his emphasis on symbolic nature of plastic in the world, 
thereby pushing aside the vitality of the biological.  Barthes can brilliantly 
describe the symbolic, biopolitical register of plasticity as “the idea of 
transformation,” while asserting skepticism about the “virtues” of plastics 
with references to its “alchemical” and “miraculous” properties.  But 
without a method of resisting the “mold of power,” Barthes boxes himself 
in.53  
 Malabou’s intervention in the philosophy of biopower points directly 
at the privileging of the symbolic over the biological in the contemporary 
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uptake of Foucault’s term. Foucault himself, she argues, set philosophy on 
that path, ignoring “the reserve of possibilities inscribed in the living being 
itself.”54 The consequence of this oversight (by philosophers and biologists) 
is profound, because it is insufficient “to defin[ing] the space of a theoretical 
disobedience against accusations of complicity among the science of the 
living being, capitalism, and the technological manipulation of life.”55 
Turning from the symbolic toward “life itself” offers that possibility, she 
argues:  
What is most material and most vital in bodies must be 
thought as an interactive space, a formative and 
transformative dynamic of organic identity that operates 
within the economy of the living being itself, not outside 
of it. The gap that is opened between the living being and 
itself though the double interface of regimes of 
transmission and regimes of reproduction is a paradoxical 
memory gap in that it reveals the now fundamental 
shifting between the irreversibility and reversibility of 
difference.56  
The gap, this interactive space that maintains ‘the living being as an open 
structure,” is where difference not only “plays,” but entertains and performs 
itself.  This space is thus critical and creative, “plastic” precisely in its 
capacity to entertain the tension between negative and positive plasticity.  
This third space is where we can “entertain” the possibility of “a conception 
of the self as a source of reproduction,” that might counter Barthes’ vision of 
a plasticized future populated by ideological replicants.  Indeed, the 
dialogue between Barthes and Malabou focuses on the importance of 
generativity; in Barthes it was figured as an ART-formed “pregnancy;” in 
Malabou, generativity goes beyond figuration and technique.  Rather, 
biological generativity is investigated in terms of an essential, positive (thus 
characteristically open) plasticity.57 
As if in response to Barthes, then, Malabou pushes toward a 
reconceptualizing of the self “as a source of reproduction,” offering biologic 
potentialities that interact with conceptual (symbolic) potentialities in both 
directions. This interaction, she argues, is the source of our vitality. Barthes’ 
tropes of pregnancy, production and reproduction are advanced and 
transformed in Malabou’s emphasis on generativity and vitality—both 
material and immaterial—and on the capacity of the brain and body to 
repair itself. These characteristics of plasticity allow Malabou to argue 
without irony that plasticity is life, as noted earlier, in contradistinction to 
Barthes’ understanding of plastic as the realization of the modern death 
drive.  Barthes, however, did come to understand the plasticity of utopia in 
characteristically writerly terms: the plasticity of utopia for him lies in the 
possibility of a “new semantics.”  
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Utopia is a (non-)site of deferral and of difference, as the common 
etymology of both words indicates [differe: carry across, scatter, disperse]. As 
a non-site, it is virtual, imaginary.58 The “real” state of utopia is a form of 
virtual reality, in the several senses of the word virtual. The plastic nature of 
Utopia makes possible the shaping, the realizing of what was not “known” 
in any objective sense, but that was already there as a potentiality, Barthes’ 
“new semantics”; Malabou’s “new relation to the image of our brain.”  In 
this way, both hold the “possibility of waiting” as an achievement in itself: 
the waiting enacts the process of imagining possibility, the shaping of 
thoughts we do not know we have, new ways of expressing them, different 
framings and representations, which take shape as we think and expect 
other-wise.  We learn to speak again, to speculate, to regenerate: we persist. 
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